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Abstract 
 
This study examines the relation between financial and tax aggressive reports on public 
companies from Europe-15, over the period of 2001-2015. Also, it pretends to analyse if 
the link between tax and financial aggressiveness gets weaker after IFRS adoption in 
Europe. To run empirical work, I use discretionary accruals calculated by modified-Jones 
model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995) as a proxy of financial aggressiveness (DFIN) 
and discretionary permanent differences as a measure of tax aggressiveness (DTAX) (used 
by Mary Frank, Luann Lynch and Sonja Rego, 2009), which I estimate using EGLS cross 
section weights for year and Fama- French 12 industries.   
To prove that firms with aggressive tax report tend to be financial aggressive and that the 
link between tax and financial aggressiveness is more significant before IFRS 
implementation I analyse Pearson and Spearman correlation. Additionally, I estimate 
relation between DTAX and DFIN when controlling for firm size, earnings management 
and tax planning incentives using OLS and apply the same model with period restriction for 
before and after IFRS adoption.  
Results suggest that financial aggressive firms tend to also be tax aggressive and the link 
between these two aggressive reports is weaker after IFRS adoption. 
Key words 
 
Tax planning, earnings management, book tax differences, aggressive financial report, 
aggressive tax report. 
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Resumo 
 
Este estudo examina a relação entre a agressividade fiscal e contabilística nas empresas 
privadas cotadas da Europa-15, durante o período de 2001-2015. Também pretende analisar 
se a relação entre a agressividade fiscal e contabilística fica mais fraca após a adoção das 
IFRS na Europa. 
Para desenvolver a análise empírica, uso accruals discricionários calculados pelo modelo de 
Jones Modificado (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995) usando-os como proxy da 
agressividade contabilística (DFIN) e aplico as diferenças discricionárias entre a fiscalidade 
e a contabilidade como medida de agressividade fiscal (DTAX) (usado por Mary Frank, 
Luann Lynch and Sonja Rego, 2009), os quais estimei usando EGLS cross section weights 
por ano e pelas 12 classificações de indústria de Fama- French.   
Analiso a correlação entre estas variáveis usando os testes de Pearson e Spearman para 
provar que as empresas com agressividade fiscal tendem a ser também agressivas a nível 
contabilístico e que a relação entre estas agressividades é mais significativa antes da adoção 
das IFRS. Adicionalmente, estimei a relação entre DTAX e DFIN controlando os efeitos de 
dimensão das empresas, a manipulação de resultados e o planeamento fiscal, para isso uso 
o método OLS e aplico da mesma forma o modelo com restrição no período para casos 
antes ou após a adoção das IFRS.  
Os resultados sugerem que as empresas com agressividade contabilística tendem a ser 
fiscalmente agressivas e que a relação entre estes dois reportes agressivos é mais fraca após 
a adoção das IFRS.  
 
Palavras-chave 
 
Planeamento fiscal; manipulação de resultados; diferenças entre fiscalidade e contabilidade; 
reporte contabilístico agressivo; reporte fiscal agressivo.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Aggressive tax and financial reports are two themes with a several literature background, 
still there are very few analysis who cover these issues as a joint strategy in Europe. Also, 
is important for investors to know if a firm that engages in aggressive financial report tend 
to also engage in aggressive tax report and vice versa. 
Therefore, this study doesn´t assume, like most of the studies, that there’s a trade-off 
between aggressive tax report and aggressive financial report (Shackelford and Shevlin 
2001), where managers who want to improve book income will be lead to higher tax costs 
or managers who desire to pay less taxes end up decreasing income reported to tax 
authorities leading to a lower income to shareholders. Otherwise I propose to investigate 
if tax aggressive firms tend to also be financial aggressive (H1). 
It is possible to conciliate these two strategies using complex tax activities to reduce tax 
expense and being able to manipulate earnings in order to expose to investors results that 
will not affect their decisions. I choose some empirical cases (Enron, Tyco and Xerox) of 
both aggressive reports to show that this is a problem with impact in the real world. 
Once there are different needs of information, tax report for tax authorities and financial 
report for capital markets, which follows different rules. These differences are called book 
tax differences and can be originated by differences between tax rules and accounting 
principles or by opportunistic tax and accounting management.  The discretionary nature of 
GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) (Philips, Pincus, and Rego 2003; Hanlon 
2005; and others), for example, makes it possible for managers to judge when the results 
should be recognised and gives them the possibility to choose accounting methods (eg. 
assets valuation or depreciation method). Two positions arise in literature about book tax 
differences, one of them defends conformity between two reports and the other supporting 
non conformity. Arguments in favour of increased conformity support, among others, are 
that less managerial discretion over financial reporting will bring less earnings management 
(Desai, 2005 and Whitaker, 2005) and proposes that non-conformity between book income 
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and tax income deteriorates quality and reliability of corporate financial reports (Desai, 
2005). On the other hand, non conformity proponents suggest that the two reports have two 
different functions once information required by financial statement users and tax 
authorities differs significantly and they also suggest that book tax conformity will lead to 
loss of financial information (Blaylock, Gaertner and Shevlin, 2015). Thus, in order to 
measure tax aggressiveness (DTAX) I used discretionary permanent book-tax differences 
exactly like Mary Frank, Luann Lynch and Sonja Rego (2009). 
On the other hand, to measure financial aggressiveness (DFIN) I employed discretionary 
accruals based on the modified-Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995). 
With these two measures set, I tested for positive relation between tax and financial 
aggressive report. For this I decided to define public Europe-15 firms as my data sample 
and define the period from 2001 to 2015. The choice of Europe-15 resides in the 
constitution of Europe in 2001 the first year of the sample. 
A set of a Pearson and Spearman correlation test and a model that estimate relation between 
DTAX and DFIN when controlling for firm size, earnings management and tax planning 
incentives, leads to the conclusion that tax aggressive firms are likely financial aggressive 
as well (H1). 
Once, implementation of IFRS meant to promote a homogeneous, comparable and 
universally recognized accounting system that leads to better financial report quality and so 
to market efficiency I tested (H2) if the link between financial and tax aggressive report 
is more significant before this implementation (2001-2004). 
To find evidence of this hypothesis I ran the same Pearson and Spearman correlation test 
and the model that estimates relation between DTAX and DFIN when controlling for firm 
size, earnings management and tax planning incentives, but with the period division of 
before (2001-2004) and after (2005-2015) IFRS adoption. Results confirm H2 showing that 
IFRS adoption brought a decrease in the link between financial and tax report. 
This study contributes to the literature with several topics. First, it is a current subject that 
shows great interest to investors and academics. The literature has many studies on 
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earnings management and tax planning, but few relate a tax and financial aggressiveness in 
Europe, which gives relevance to this research. Second, I additionally studied the 
relationship of tax and financial aggressiveness controlling for incentives of firm size, tax 
planning and earnings management, also studied by Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009), which 
isn’t much explored in Europe. Finally, I added the study of the relation between tax and 
financial aggressiveness before and after IFRS adoption which is a contribution to IFRS 
implementation literature. 
The present study will be divided in sections. Section II shows Prior research and 
hypothesis definition, which decomposes in A. Book-tax conformity and non-conformity, B. 
Adoption of IFRS and C. Tax planning and earnings management: empirical cases. 
Hereafter, there are section III Methodology divided in A. Data and B. Models and 
variables. Section IV presents empirical results of models estimation and lastly section V 
shows the conclusions, the limitation of the study and future research suggestions. 
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II. Prior research and hypothesis development 
 
Chapter II starts with the main question of this study and some initial definitions to make a 
way for all the analysis developed being then divided in three sections. Section A proposes 
two key positions on literature about book-tax differences. Section B describes an 
important period for conformity in Europe and section C relates how book- tax differences 
were used in empirical cases and on literature developing here the two hypothesis. 
Thus, the main question of this study relies on how managers can increase book profits and 
at the same time decrease taxable income, this is the existence of aggressive financial report 
and aggressive tax report. The generally accepted answer is that firms can only embrace 
this strategy because there are two types of reports, tax report for tax authorities and 
financial report for capital markets, that follows different rules which creates book tax 
differences. Some authors (Philips, Pincus, and Rego 2003; Hanlon 2005; and others) show 
that this gap happens in part because of the discretionary nature of GAAP (generally 
accepted accounting policies). Chen, Gavious and Yosef (2013) provides evidence that non 
conformity between tax and financial reports lead firms to manage book and taxable 
income in the same period, while if firms are under a conformity system they have to face a 
trade-off between aggressive tax report and aggressive financial report. 
Book tax differences could be divided in two components: temporary differences and 
permanent differences. 
The first ones (temporary differences) result from temporal variances between tax and 
accounting recognition, they are the differences between the value of assets and liabilities 
for both accounting and tax purposes, that result in a value that will be taxed or deducted in 
future years when assets have been recovered or liabilities have been regularized (generally 
amortizations and debt impairment).   
On the other hand permanent differences result from different definition of results for tax 
and accounting report and directly affect taxes playable. 
There are many studies related to book tax differences in literature as presented below: 
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Desai (2003) found that depreciation methods, foreign income and non-qualified stock 
options explain less than 50% of book-tax differences (BTD), the rest may be associated 
with either earnings management or tax shelters. 
Lev and Nissim (2004) argue that being aware of earnings management, investors use tax 
income as the benchmark, once they found that ratio of tax-to-book income predicts 
earnings growth up to five years ahead. 
Wilson (2009) suggest that BTD and discretionary accruals are the key attributes to identify 
tax sheltering firms. 
Finally, Seidman (2010) found that changes in GAAP, economic conditions and 
discretionary accruals explain about 55% of BTD variance, with the remaining 45% being 
attributed to other factors as tax law changes and tax sheltering behaviour. 
A. Book-tax conformity and non-conformity 
 
So the literature held two positions about book- tax differences, the first supporting book-
tax conformity and the second defending the non-conformity. 
Several authors, namely, Desai (2005), Whitaker (2006) and many others have defended 
book-tax conformity. 
A main argument for increased conformity states that less managerial discretion over 
financial reporting will bring less earnings management (Desai, 2005 and Whitaker, 2005) 
and that firms will not be getting the advantage of the major discretionary  of GAAP face to 
tax rules (Phillips et al. 2003). 
Another argument suggests that increased conformity would decrease earnings 
management by eliminating tax accruals, which can be used to either manage or smooth 
GAAP income without affecting taxable income (Whitaker 2005). 
Desai (2005) proposes that non-conformity between book income and tax income 
deteriorates quality and reliability of corporate financial reports. He also suggests that the 
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discretionary nature of corporate profits have been increased by “financial engineering that 
transforms the nature and timing of receipts, the growing importance of contractual 
arrangements and the attendant ambiguity over the timing of receipts, and the increased 
accessibility of offshore tax havens”. This author questions the structure of the current 
corporate tax system, to be precise, Desai suggests that if corporate tax returns were less 
confidential, investors would have another view of corporate profitability; also advocates 
that firms should have some automatic incentives for having conformity of book and tax 
profits reducing this way the tax avoidance and earnings management. He also considers 
that the fact in which the dual reporting system enables managerial malfeasance is in itself 
an argument against the current corporate tax system. 
More book-tax conformity probably reduces the possible ways taken by firms to handle 
both financial and tax incomes (Carnahan and Novack 2002)  and would avoid a lose-lose 
situation, where capital markets end up with less meaningfully  profits, government collects 
less revenue and as to allocate resources to exploit these opportunities (Desai 2005). 
  
In China Chan et al. (2010) found an increase in tax audit adjustments over the period 
1996–2003 as book-tax conformity decreased. These adjustments were related primarily to 
items that caused book-tax differences and not to book-tax conforming items, which make 
them conclude that tax noncompliance increased consistent with Chinese firms becoming 
more tax aggressive.  
 
In summary, book-tax conformity will reduce managerial opportunism over financial 
reporting, restrain abusive tax shelters, and minimize firm compliance costs (Blaylock, 
Gaertner and Shevlin, 2015). 
 
Although there’s a lot of authors supporting book-tax conformity who could prove their 
theories as studied above, there are also evidence that non-conformity increases both 
explanatory power of annual regressions of book income on taxable income and report 
quality, as I analyse bellow. 
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So there are authors like Hanlon (2008); Shackelford,D. (2006); Plesko (2006); Atwood et 
al. (2010) defending non-conformity. 
 
These authors primarily suggest that the two reports have two different functions because 
the information required by financial statement users and tax authorities differs 
significantly, and book tax conformity will lead to loss of financial information. As well, 
reduction compliance costs would not be as large as proponents of book-tax conformity 
claim (Blaylock, Gaertner and Shevlin, 2015). 
 
Michele Hanlon (2008) shows that when book- tax conformity increases the information 
given by the results it’s reduced and book-tax differences have information about earnings 
persistence, accruals persistence and cash-flows (Hanlon 2005; Atwood et al. 2010). 
Even considering that a greater conformity can restrict aggressive accounting and tax report, 
the benefits that are created by having different information to different sources like capital 
markets and tax authorities it’s above the cost of opportunistic use of the two types of 
reports (Atwood et al. 2010) 
Blaylock, Gaertner and Shevlin (2015) found that higher book-tax conformity could not 
limit earnings management and may actually work in the opposite direction. 
 
B. Adoption of IFRS 
 
Globalization brought a lot of transactions and investments in past years and so the need of 
harmonized accounting standards which promote a homogeneous, comparable and 
universally recognized accounting system that leads to better financial report quality and so 
to market efficiency. 
Following a system of conformity as defended in section A and with the purpose of 
creating a harmonized system, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) 
sets international accounting standards (IAS) which determines how transactions and other 
events should be reflected in financial statements. 
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Meanwhile in 2001, International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) established new 
standards known as the international financial reporting standards (IFRS). Although these 
standards were not set as an obligation, several countries required the financial statements 
of publicly traded companies to be prepared in accordance with them. 
In Europe with E.U. Regulation No.1606/2002, after 1st January of 2005 all listed 
companies are obliged to use IFRS for their consolidated financial statement. Still for 
individual accounts and non-publicly traded companies, the obligation or option for IFRS 
implementation differs between member states. 
Anglo-Saxon accounting systems are “investor oriented” just like IFRS, since these two 
systems don’t have so many differences, countries with these principles generally consent 
unlisted companies to choose between IFRS and local GAAP. Still, “creditor protection 
oriented” countries commonly opted by maintain local GAAP at least for individual 
accounts (Guggiola, G. 2010) 
After all the need of information for capital markets and the necessity for improving the 
quality of financial data (when local GAAPs are weak) pushed many other countries to 
voluntary adopt IFRS for consolidated and individual accounts of both listed and unlisted 
companies. 
It is worth to notice that in countries with a stronger link between financial and tax report, 
the adoption of IFRS has been preferential adopted only for consolidated accounts (by 
obligation) and for individual accounts firms opted by local GAAP. What explains this 
phenomenon it’s the need of organized accounting, for individual accounts, based on local 
GAAP for fiscal purposes, namely tax estimation. Therefore, this would lead to an 
increased cost for firms to maintain two systems, ending up with the non-adoption of IFRS 
for individual accounts which turns full harmonization harder. 
Despite of it, thanks to increased compliance costs due to the existence both local GAAP 
and IFRS (listed companies prepare their consolidated accounts using IFRS and needs to 
apply local GAAP to prepare individual accounts) and the reduced capability to compare 
companies’ performance among different countries and, within each country, between 
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listed and unlisted companies (Haller, 2002), some authors found an increased convergence 
between the two accounting systems after 2005 (Erickson et al., 2009). 
C. Tax planning and earnings management: empirical cases 
 
Although efforts to create an environment of conformity in a worldwide basis there are 
studies that emerged since the mid 1990’s to the early 2000’s showing that tax 
aggressiveness began to follow financial reporting aggressiveness (Lennox, Lisowsky and 
Pittman, 2013). Many authors enforce this theme by noticing book income shifting from 
taxable income, for example, Plesko (2000) found that between 1994 and 1998 pretax book 
income grew faster than current or deferred tax expense and he blame tax shelters and 
financial reporting aggressiveness. 
Companies are increasingly facing more inspections (Cloyd 1995; Mills 1998; Badertscher, 
Philips, Pincus, and Rego 2008) and audits (Hanlon and Krishnan 2006), also there are 
more mechanisms to control tax planning and earnings management. Even so, it’s known 
that, recently, firms have engaged in both tax planning and earnings management creating a 
number of scandals for fraudulent accounting practices and abusive tax shelter transactions 
in U.S., as Desai 2005 show in his study.  
I’m going to analyse the case of three firms – Enron, Tyco and Xerox- that show us how 
tax planning can lead to manipulation of accounting profits and how increase book profits 
trigger tax avoidance (Desai, 2005). 
Starting with one example used by Enron, it’s called Project Teresa and started in 1997 
with tax savings as the apparent purpose. However, with this strategy, Enron in 2000’s 
ended up incurring in major tax obligations to achieve a greater increase of book income, 
which made us believe this project had as the main motivation financial benefits. 
They made many transactions that would reduce federal tax obligations into future but 
ended up bringing current increases in accounting profits. 
Briefly, this firm who had already guaranteed by the use of tax shelters that it would not 
pay taxes well into future, used special purpose vehicles to increase taxable basis of one of 
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its buildings, accomplishing a greater depreciation for a while, and consequently less taxes. 
Tax benefits generated by this transaction would not happen in the near future but 
accounting standards allowed recognising future reductions in tax expenses. 
Enron between 1993 and 1997 also raised its instruments by approximately $800 million 
considering these instruments as “debt” for tax purposes (to generate tax expense) and as 
“preferred equity” in accounting terms (to not decrease earnings per share). The company 
admitted the usage of strategies to avoid investors/creditors warnings signals “too much 
debt and dilution of their ownership rights” (U.S. Congress, 2003b, p. 323). 
Same way, Tyco used tax avoidance to enhance financial performance by using 
intercompany loans to relocate profits and subsidiaries in tax heavens to serve as a 
destination of foreign pretax profits. 
In 1997 Tyco acquired ADT Security Systems, which is located in Bermuda, as a reverse 
merger (the private company trades shares with the public shell in exchange for the shell's 
stock, transforming the acquirer into a public company) to guarantee corporate inversion.  
This corporation located in a tax heaven was used to avoid the U.S. tax treatment of foreign 
income. 
Additionally, with help of some financial subsidiaries, (e.g. Tyco International Group (TIG) 
in Luxembourg) Tyco reallocated profits from the operating subsidiaries located in high- 
tax countries. Such relocation has been done through intercompany loans, so operating 
subsidiaries are highly levered and incur interest expense that reduces their taxable income 
in countries with high income tax rates. 
This structure allows the company to shift income from high-tax countries to countries with 
no income taxes.  
It is important to notice that the usage of tax planning strategies lead to earnings 
management by Tyco managers. 
The complexity created by the tax avoidance strategies provided the opportunity for some 
managers, who were the only ones who actually understood the full workings and 
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complexity of Tyco, to use their advantage to cover other transactions and in order to gain 
authorization for a variety of transactions. 
Also, the ambiguity of true tax obligations caused by pre-tax profit shifting to foreign 
source was used for managers to hide true firm- performance and profitability and so divert 
funds. “One specific example of the advantages of this ambiguity was the use of the 
balance sheet item “Accrued Federal Income Taxes” – otherwise used as a reserve account 
for taxes owed to U.S. tax authorities – to facilitate the concealment of $41 million paid to 
executives as part of the TyCom bonus scheme. “- Desai, 2005. 
 
Lastly, since subsidiaries were based in bank secrecy jurisdictions the sales of Tyco stock 
to subsidiaries made by managers, made it possible to hide those sales from investors until 
year-end, a fact that advanced the ability to conceal their fraudulent conduct from investors. 
 
Finally, the analysis to Xerox shows that executives with the objective of reach short-term 
targets opportunistically re-characterized the timing of various transactions and 
opportunistically recognized earnings. 
Stands out that at the same time CEO compensation upward essentially through exercises 
of stock options. 
Their attempts not only to reach targets for earning manipulations but also they tried to 
reduce effective tax rate” on Xerox’s worldwide operations (Bandler and Maremont, 2001). 
To achieve this they made some changes such as consolidating employees in Ireland, 
transfer intellectual property and transfer leasing portfolios.  
Thereby the increase volume of foreign activity that would have a lower tax taxation led to 
the wanted reduction on effective income tax rate. Hence, this helped them to report 
increased earnings per share which they wouldn’t have been able to otherwise. 
As seen in an empirical way, aggressive tax and financial reports can both be done at the 
same time. We also have some authors that studied this case, with some of them defending 
the trade-off between these two types of aggressive reporting and others defending there is 
no such trade- off. 
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Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew (2004) suggest that some firms censured by SEC (Securities 
and Exchange Commission) deliberately pay more taxes to help dissimulate accounting 
fraud. Blaylock, Shevlin and Wilson (2012) found opposite evidence to Frank, Lynch and 
Rego (2009), this is, they found that firms with aggressive financial reports aren’t more 
likely to join aggressive tax reports.  
Otherwise, there is Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009) perspective which defends that firms can 
upward book income and downward taxable income.  In agreement Desai (2005) and Desai 
and Dharmapala (2006) evidence that managers, with the excuse of diminishing taxes to 
create benefits for shareholders, use complex tax avoidance strategies (including tax 
shelters) to deviate corporate resources which later will be covered distorting financial 
statements. In fact these authors [Desai (2005) and Desai and Dharmapala (2006)] propose, 
“that timing the overstatement of accounting income to coincide with the understatement of 
taxable income provides cover that facilitates the diversion of corporate resources”. Also 
Desai and Dharmapala (2009) sustain that engaging in tax shelter may reduce the marginal 
costs of diverting income.  
Therefore, our first hypothesis of study arises: 
H1: Firms with aggressive tax report tend to also be financial aggressive. 
Once there are empirical cases of a positive relation between tax and financial 
aggressiveness and at same time there are efforts in Europe to achieve conformity, I 
propose to formalize the following hypothesis: 
H2: The link between tax and financial aggressiveness is more significant before IFRS 
implementation. 
Next chapter describes data, variables and models used to study this two hypothesis. 
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III. Methodology 
 
Methodology is divided in two sections. The first one describes constitution of sample and 
the last one defines four models. The first two are used to measure financial and tax 
aggressiveness and respective variables that will be applied at the two final models and 
used to test correlation. 
A. Data  
 
This study uses data panel models. There are some advantages on the usage of this model 
such as: panel data can control for individual heterogeneity and allow identifying and 
measuring effects that are not detectable using other data models; reduce the collinearity 
and allow for more degrees of freedom while being more efficient. In this sense, through a 
panel data structure we can control for unobservable effects that are present in cross-section 
and time dimensions (Baltagi 2003). 
When estimating with panel data there are usually two models used: fixed effects and 
random effects models. To determine whether to choose random or fixed effects (In all 4 
models), I perform Hausman test and conclude that fixed effects model is more appropriate. 
Nevertheless, I do not use cross sectional fixed effects once I have to estimate equation 1 
and 2 (described in this chapter, section B1 and B2, respectively) by year, so I choose 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) cross-section weights with transformed model to estimate 
these two equations because Breusch-Pagan test shows heterocedasticity caused by total 
assets. For equation 3 and 4 I used OLS because there is a model with dummies, and so I 
choose not to use fixed effects. 
For the study of the hypothesis presented above, I obtain my data from Worldscope 
Database (for Statutory tax rate I use information available at https://tradingeconomics.com 
acceded at 10/05/2017) and use a sample of public firms from Europe 15, which is the 
constitution of Europe in 2001 the first year of the sample. This means that I’m going to 
work with Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom and Sweden. 
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For my sample, I define the period of analyses between 2001 and 2015, obtaining a 15 
years sample with information comprehended before and after the adoption of IFRS in 
Europe, with expectation of having a period of bigger conformity (2005-2015) and a period 
with less conformity (2001-2004). 
I start with 4.981 firms (74.715 firm- years), then eliminate all firms with lack of data in all 
variables (keeping 4.004 firms), furthermore eliminate observations of regulated industries 
such as utilities (SIC code 49) and financial services (SIC codes 60-69) as these firms likely 
face different reporting incentives and regulatory scrutiny than other firms and end up with 
2.790 firms (41.850 firm-years).  
With this sample, I compute each of the measures of reporting aggressiveness, however, 
some additional observations have been lost because of lack of data necessary to compute 
financial reporting aggressiveness or tax aggressiveness, as I will demonstrate bellow for 
each model. 
 
B. Models and variables 
 
There are studies revealing that permanent tax planning was common in the second half of 
the 1990’s and it’s thought to be the most advantageous type of tax planning (Weisbach 
2002; McGill and Outslay 2004). 
For tax aggressiveness Mary Frank, Luann Lynch and Sonja Rego (2009) use discretionary 
permanent book-tax differences (DTAX) exactly like I’m going to, and they state 
aggressive tax reporting as downward manipulation of taxable income through tax 
planning that may or may not be considered fraudulent tax evasion.  
To measure aggressive financial reporting I’m using discretionary accruals (DFIN) 
calculated by modified-Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995), and I define this 
financial measure as Mary Frank, Luann Lynch and Sonja Rego (2009) did, this is, as the 
upward earnings management that may or may not be fraud.  
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I will consider, in an empirical way, aggressive financial reporting when firms have high 
discretionary accruals and aggressive tax reporting in cases when there’s a high permanent 
book tax difference. 
 
B1. Measure of aggressive tax report: 
Many authors use book tax differences as a proxy to measure tax avoidance. Still, since 
taxable income is confidential (we can estimate it using observable financial report data), 
book tax differences are not directly observable to most researchers or investors (Desai and 
Dharmapala,2009). 
Comprix, Graham, and Moore (2011) estimate BTD (total BTDs) as the difference between 
net income and taxable income, scaled by average assets: 
𝐵𝑇𝐷 =  
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Where net income is measured as income before extraordinary items and average assets is 
the mean total assets. Taxable income is estimated by grossing up current tax expense: 
 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 =
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑡
∗ (1 − 𝑡) 
Current portion of the income tax expense is grossed up by t, the top statutory corporate 
federal tax rate. Current tax expense is the sum of current federal and foreign taxes or, if 
missing, total tax expense less deferred tax less current foreign tax less current state tax 
expenses (Mary Frank, Luann Lynch and Sonja Rego, 2009).  Taxable income is multiplied 
by (1- t) to make it comparable to net income, which is measured after tax. Then estimate 
TEMP, the temporary component of total BTDs, by grossing up deferred taxes: 
𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃 =
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑡
∗
(1 − 𝑡)
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
16 
 
Deferred taxes are grossed up by t, multiplied by (1- t), and scaled by total assets, making it 
comparable in measurement to taxable income. Finally, they estimate PERM, the non-
temporary component of total BTDs, as the difference between BTD and TEMP: 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑀 = 𝐵𝑇𝐷 − 𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃 
Mary Frank, Luann Lynch and Sonja Rego (2009) estimate discretionary permanent 
differences (DTAX), a measure of tax aggressiveness. They regress total permanent 
differences on nondiscretionary items such as goodwill (INTANG), consolidation 
accounting (MI, UNCON), state taxes (CSTE) and change in net operating losses (NOL) 
once these items could cause permanent differences but are probably not related to tax 
aggressiveness. 
I apply the same model (as Frank, Lynch and Rego 2009) to estimate DTAX but with some 
modifications specifically, once these authors use that measure for a U.S. sample they 
apply some variables that are not possible to use in Europe, such as Current Federal Tax 
that I’m going to substitute for total tax expense minus deferred tax expense minus current 
foreign tax minus current state tax expenses, as explained above. Also, I didn’t control for 
change in net operating losses because the lack of data in the database I worked with. 
I estimate equation (1) below by Fama-French 12 industries and fiscal year, using Panel 
EGLS cross-section weights, where all variables (including the intercept α0) are scaled by 
beginning-of-year total assets (to remove firm size effect and control for heterocedasticity) 
and use the residuals (ε) from equation (1) as the measure of discretionary permanent 
differences (DTAX). 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐿𝐴𝐺𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
            (1) 
Where: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 = {𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 −
[(𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡) + 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡)]
𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
} − (
𝐷𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
) 
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PERMDIFF it = Total book-tax differences less temporary book-tax differences for firm i 
in year t, 
BI it = Pre-tax book income for firm i in year t, 
TTE it = Total tax expense for firm i in year t, 
CFOR it = Current foreign tax expense for firm i in year t, 
DTE it = Deferred tax expense for firm i in year t, 
STR t = Statutory tax rate in year t. 
Control variables
1
: 
INTANG it = Goodwill and other intangibles for firm i in year t, 
UNCON it = Income (loss) reported under the equity method for firm i in year t, 
MI it = Income (loss) attributable to minority interest for firm i in year t, 
CSTE it 
2
 = Current state income tax expense for firm i in year t, 
LAGPERM it = One-year lagged PERMDIFF for firm i in year t, and 
ε it = Discretionary permanent difference (DTAX) for firm i in year t. 
As I mentioned above permanent differences reveal that some parts aren’t related to tax 
reporting aggressiveness, so like Mary Frank, Luann Lynch and Sonja Rego (2009) I use 
variables, explained bellow, to control for nondiscretionary permanent differences. 
Goodwill and other intangible assets (INTANG) are included because there are differences 
in tax and accounting deductions of amortizations (these differences create permanent 
differences unrelated to tax aggressiveness). 
                                                             
1
 If MI, CFOR, UNCON, CTSE or INTANG are missing on database I set this value as zero (according Mary 
Frank, Luann Lynch and Sonja Rego (2009)). 
2
 Once Europe is not organized by states I use as proxy for state expense, tax liability which is due within the 
normal operating cycle of the company. 
18 
 
Concerning to income or loss attributable to the equity method (UNCON) and to minority 
interests (MI), differences between accounting and tax raises due to equity interests 
treatment in less than 100 percent-owned entities. 
I control for Current state tax expense (CSTE) once taxable income is reduced by this 
expense and book income is not. 
Control for Lagged value of permanent book-tax differences (LAGPERM) avoid 
differences that persevere through time not related to tax aggressiveness (although that is 
not the intention LAGPERM also exclude some tax shelter activity). 
 
DTAX (measure of aggressive tax report) excludes temporary differences which avoid 
earnings management, but also excludes tax shelter activities that create this type of 
differences (temporary), nevertheless DTAX catch tax shelter activity if produced both 
permanent and temporary differences (Mary Frank, Luann Lynch and Sonja Rego, 2009). 
The authors even tested if this measure could capture potential tax sheltering activity and 
for that they used Graham and Tucker’s (2006) sample of tax shelter firms to prove that its 
measure (DTAX) is positively related to tax shelter incidence and they did prove that. Still, 
Lisowsky (2010) studied the relation between DTAX and a large sample of firms indicated 
by IRS as having tax shelter activity and found no significant relation between both. 
The fact they use discretionary permanent differences instead of permanent differences 
only helps to highlight tax planning positions that are not benign, this is that are 
opportunistically used by managers.  
B2. Measure of aggressive financial report: 
The differences between net income, cash flow from operations and cash flow from 
investment activities it’s known as accruals (results that are part of profits but that not 
necessarily imply changes in financial availabilities). The true accrual represents an 
effective addition on equity independent of financial availabilities.  
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The problem is that the opportunistic manager increases or decreases these accruals with 
the objective of influencing profit. When appropriate, the "manager" may take the decision 
to increase or decrease accruals for reasons unrelated to the reality of the business, thus 
literature subdivide them into: discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals. The 
latter would be those required according to the reality of the business, the former would 
have the only purpose of "managing" the result, earnings management. That’s why 
discretionary accruals are considered a proxy of earnings management. These could be 
either positive or negative depending if the firm wants to increase or decrease, respectively, 
its results. 
So, as a proxy for financial reporting aggressiveness I’m going to use discretionary accruals, 
where calculation of this measure is based on the modified-Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, 
and Sweeney 1995). I had estimated equation (3) below by Fama-French 12 industries and 
fiscal year, using Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights), where all variables (including the 
intercept α0) are scaled by beginning of year total assets (to remove firm size effect and 
control for heterocedasticity). Residuals (η) from equation (2) are the measure of 
discretionary accruals (DFIN). 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 (2) 
Where: 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = (𝐸𝐵𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡) − [(𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡)] 
TACC it 
3
= Total accruals for firm i in year t, 
EBEI it = Earnings before extraordinary items from the statement of cash flow for 
firm i in year t, 
TTE it = Total tax expense for firm i in year t, 
CFO it = Cash flow from operations for firm i in year t, 
ITP it = Income taxes paid from the statement of cash flow for firm i in year t, 
                                                             
3
 I did not include Extraordinary items and discontinued operations from statement of cash flow because all 
results obtained from database where zero. 
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ΔREV it = Change in sales for firm i from year t-1 to year t, 
ΔAR it = Change in accounts receivable for firm i from year t-1 to year t, 
PPE it = Gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t, and 
η it = Discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
 
The original Jones Model assumes accruals should be a function of revenue growth (△ 
REV) and tangible assets (PPE). Accruals that fit this model are normal accruals that are 
explained by normal business activities. Because of this, Jones uses these two variables as 
independent variables to predict the discretionary accruals. 
However Jones model assumes that all the variances of revenue are non-discretionary, and 
it is known that managers could use credit sales to manage earnings, this way arises 
modified version of the Jones Model. 
This last model deducts from revenue growth the variance of receivables (△ REC) and so 
assumes that all changes in credit sales in the event period results from earnings 
management. 
Thus, accruals that do not fit this model are discretionary accruals and are more likely to 
reflect earnings management. (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995). 
 
To avoid any inappropriate correlation between DFIN and DTAX, the former one is 
calculated on a pre-tax basis (as Mary Frank, Luann Lynch and Sonja Rego (2009) and 
Hribar and Collins (2002)), that way if a firm increase its book income by reducing tax 
contingency it will not affect DFIN (Mary Frank, Luann Lynch and Sonja Rego (2009)). 
B3. Relation between financial and tax aggressiveness: 
Now that measures of tax and financial aggressiveness are calculated (with residuals from 
equation 1 and 2, respectively), I test if firms with aggressive tax report tend to also be 
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financial aggressive (H1). First compute Pearson and Spearman correlations
4
 between 
measure of aggressive financial report (DFIN) and the measure of tax reporting 
aggressiveness (DTAX) and as evidenced for Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009) and empirical 
cases suggest, I expect to find a positive correlation between these two measures. 
I calculate Pearson and Spearman correlations, before 2005 and after this year, to find 
evidence supporting that the link between tax and financial aggressiveness is more 
significant before IFRS implementation once there is less conformity in Europe and so 
firms could use more methods to join financial and tax aggressive strategies (H2). 
Additionally, I examine the relation between financial and tax reporting aggressiveness 
after controlling for incentives for tax planning and earnings management, using OLS, 
similar to Mary Frank, Luann Lynch and Sonja Rego (2009), except I don’t apply some 
variables due to lack of data on database I use, some others have been lost because the lack 
of sense in an European context. I also run this estimation before (2001-2004) and after 
IFRS adoption (2005-2015) to test if coefficients maintain signal prediction. 
Due to the uncertain of causality between DFIN and DTAX Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009) 
estimate relation between DTAX and DFIN controlling for incentives changing dependent 
variable between both (DFIN and DTAX). 
𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑀1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑀2𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐸𝑀3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8∆𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        
           (3) 
 
𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑀1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑀2𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐸𝑀3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8∆𝑃𝑇𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        
          (4) 
                                                             
4
 Spearman rank correlation test does not make any assumptions about the distribution.  The assumptions of 
Spearman correlation are that data must be at least ordinal and scores on one variable must be monotonically 
related to the other variable.  
For the Pearson correlation, both variables should be normally distributed. Other assumptions include 
linearity and homoscedasticity. I run Jaque-Bera test and found both variables should be normally distributed. 
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Equations (3) and (4) control for incentives to tax planning (PTROA, LEV), incentives to 
manage earnings (MTB, EM1, EM2, EM3, ΔPTCFO), and firm size (SIZE). 
LEV it = total debt for firm i at year t, divided by total assets at year t;  
PTROA it = pre-tax income for firm i at year t, divided by total assets at year t-1; 
SIZE it = natural log of total assets for firm i at year t. 
MTB it = Market value of common equity for firm i at year t-1, divided by book 
value of common equity for firm i at year t-1; 
ΔPTCFO it = change in pre-tax cash flow from operations for firm i in year t, 
divided by total assets for firm i at year t-1; 
EM1 it = 1 if net income in year t, divided by the market value of common equity at 
year t-1, is greater than zero and less than or equal to 0.01 for firm i; 0 otherwise; 
EM2 it = 1 if the change in net income from year t-1 to year t, divided by the market 
value of common equity at year t-2 is greater than zero and less than or equal to 
0.01 for firm i; 0 otherwise; 
EM3 it = 1 if firm i’s actual earnings less the median analyst forecast for fiscal year 
t (as reported on I/B/E/S) is greater than zero and less than or equal to 0.01 ; 0 
otherwise. 
 
As mentioned, I apply a set of variables to control firm-specific characteristics, tax 
planning and earnings management. 
Previous research has shown that size, leverage and return on assets variables are 
associated with tax aggressiveness (Chen et al. 2010; Atwood et al. 2012) and earnings 
management (Burgstahler et al. 2006). 
To control for incentives to tax planning I use pre-tax return on assets (PTROA) and 
leverage (LEV).  
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Profitability: 
With regard to the first (PTROA) which measures profitability has been selected because 
literature suggests proportionality between firm’s tax liability and its profitability, once 
firm’s wealth maximization relies also on firm’s ability to reduce its tax liability (Ogundajo 
and Onakoya 2016).  So I expect a positive and significant coefficient for this variable.  
Leverage: 
Relative to leverage (LEV) it has been widely studied in literature because it is expected 
that firms that have an higher debt-to-equity ratios are more efficient at minimizing 
corporate taxes as they use debt deductions to significantly decrease the amount of 
corporate taxes they pay and so it works as a substitute for tax planning (Graham and 
Tucker, 2006). Also, Kraft (2014) suggests restrictions imposed by lenders make it more 
difficult to divert value of projects to own benefit, still lenders expect efficiency that will 
result in less taxes. This way I believe that leverage can behave as a substitute for tax 
planning and expect a negative and significant coefficient. 
 
Now, attending to control incentives to manage earnings I use market-to-book (MTB), 
capacity to achieve certain thresholds (EM1, EM2, EM3) and change in pre-tax cash flows 
from operations (ΔPTCFO). 
 
Market-to-book: 
 
Market-to-book is used as a proxy for growth opportunities of firm’s operations, Dechow 
and Skinner (2000) suggest that market expectation of future growth could lead to manage 
earnings due to the pressure put on managers. In agreement with previous research 
(McNichols 2000, 2002) I expect a positive impact on accruals (DFIN) for growing firms. 
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Achieving thresholds: 
 
There are several studies (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Moehrle, 
2002; Holland and Ramsay, 2003; Moreira and Pope, 2007; Jacob and Jorgensen, 2007; 
Lee, 2007; Charoenwong and Jiraporn, 2009; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008) that 
demonstrate firms could run into earnings management to achieve or exceed certain targets 
such as: zero earnings (EM1), last period’s earnings (EM2), and analysts' earnings 
forecasts (EM3). 
 
Some studies presented above test if, under the null hypothesis of no earnings management, 
the distributions of scaled earnings changes (EM2), surprises (EM3) and levels (EM1) are 
relatively smooth (they describe “smooth” as the difference between the actual number of 
observations and the expected number of observations on an interval, divided by the 
estimated standard deviation of the difference). They find graphical and statistical evidence 
(for all three threshold) that there is an unexpected low frequency in the section 
immediately to the left of zero and an unexpected high frequency in the section that 
includes zero, which leads us to conclude for earnings manipulation in order to achieve 
these thresholds and hence I expect positive and significant coefficients for all three 
variables. 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) and Othman and Zeghal (2006), enhance the fact that 
most of these empirical works were focused on Anglo-Saxon countries characterised by 
outsider economies with relatively dispersed ownership, strong investor protection, and 
large stock markets. 
 
Change in pre-tax cash flows from operations: 
 
Change in pre-tax cash flows from operations it’s included as a measure of current 
operating performance.  Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) show that the usage of cash flow 
from operations to manage earnings as been widely suggested in literature.  
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According to, Roychowdhury (2006) studied the incentive of managers to manipulate real 
activities (“defined as management actions that deviate from normal business practices, 
undertaken with the primary objective of meeting certain earnings thresholds”), which 
affects cash flows and in some cases accruals, to achieve certain earnings targets. He uses 
cash flow from operations (CFO) to capture the real activities manipulation around the zero 
earnings threshold and found evidence consistent with firms trying to avoid losses by 
offering price discounts to temporarily increase sales. In conclusion, I hope to find a 
positive and significant coefficient for changes in pre-tax cash flows from operations. 
 
Lastly, I control for firm- specific characteristics with Size variable, measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets.  Hu, Cao and Zheng (2015) suggest that once larger firms 
are more complex (operating, financing, and investing), they have more opportunity to 
manage earnings. On the other hand, positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1978) argue that because of the high visibility and control, large companies will end up 
paying a higher tax burden. Consequently, I do not predict the sign for its coefficient. 
 
Next chapter will present results from estimation of all these models. 
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IV. Empirical results 
 
This chapter presents results from estimation of tax and financial aggressive measures and 
results from correlation between these two measure before and after IFRS adoption. 
Additionally, shows the results from estimation of model 3 and 4 which relates DTAX to 
DFIN and controls for tax planning and earnings management incentives.   
A. Measure of tax aggressiveness 
 
As mentioned above, to measure tax aggressiveness I estimate discretionary permanent 
differences (DTAX), a measure of tax aggressiveness also used by Mary Frank, Luann 
Lynch and Sonja Rego (2009). I regress the total permanent differences (PERMDIFF) on 
nondiscretionary items such as goodwill (INTANG), consolidation accounting (MI, 
UNCON) and state taxes (CSTE) once these items could cause permanent differences. So I 
estimate equation (1) by Fama-French sic code (12 industries) and fiscal year using Panel 
EGLS cross-section weights, where all variables (including the intercept α0) are scaled by 
beginning-of-year total assets and use the residuals (ε) from equation (1) as the measure of 
discretionary permanent differences (DTAX). 
It is important to notice that some data has been lost in the estimation of DTAX because I 
require each firm to have at least 6 years observations, this way I end up with 2.291 firms 
(34.365 firm-years). 
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Table 1 
Estimation of DTAX (discretionary permanent differences) by Fama-French 12 
industries and fiscal year from 2001-2015 
 
    
 
DTAX 
 n= 2291 Coefficient Std. Error P-value 
 Intercept -13,674 3,229 0,000 
 INTANG 0,004 0,001 0,000 
 UNCON 0,177 0,046 0,000 
 MI 0,679 0,031 0,000 
 CSTE 2,662 0,015 0,000 
 LAGPERM 0,292 0,004 0,000 
 R-squared 0,754 
   Adjusted R-squared 0,754 
   Variable Definitions (all variables are at year t unless stated otherwise): 
PERMDIFF = total book-tax differences - temporary book-tax differences = [{BI - [((TTE-DTE-CSTE-CFOR) +CFOR) 
/STR]}- (DTE/STR)] divided by total assets at year t-1; 
BI = pre-tax book income; 
TTE = Total tax expense; 
CFOR =current foreign tax expense; 
DTE =deferred tax expense; 
STR = statutory tax rate; 
INTANG =goodwill and other intangibles divided by total assets at year t-1; 
UNCON = income (loss) reported under the equity method divided by total assets at year t-1; 
MI = income (loss) attributable to minority interest divided by total assets at year t-1; 
CSTE= current state income tax expense divided by total assets at year t-1 (it’s not divided by total assets when calculate 
PERMDIFF); 
LAGPERM = PERMDIFF at year t-1 divided by total assets at year t-1. 
As demonstrated by table 1 all coefficients are significantly different from zero and, with 
exception of intercept (Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009) also obtain negative and significant 
coefficient for intercept), all coefficients are positive. 
Although these variables are just to control for permanent differences caused by non-
discretionary items, coefficient of INTANG shows that differences in tax and accounting 
deductions of amortizations impact positively permanent differences. Frank, Lynch and 
Rego (2009) obtained a negative coefficient for this variable although it’s not significant. 
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 Also, UNCON and MI influence positively PERMDIFF which lead us to conclude that 
differences between accounting and tax raises due to equity interests treatment in less than 
100 percent-owned entities create permanent differences. For MI, Frank, Lynch and Rego 
(2009) also obtained a positive coefficient but for UNCON they find negative coefficient, 
even so their coefficients aren’t significant. 
I control for Current state tax expense (CSTE) and as Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009) I 
found a positive coefficient (they do not found a significant coefficient for this variable) 
which is consistent with current state tax expense increasing permanent differences. 
Similarly, LAGPERM shows a positive and significant coefficient (as in Frank, Lynch and 
Rego (2009)) demonstrating that there are differences that persevere through time and 
affect permanent differences although not related to tax aggressiveness. 
Table 1 shows a high adjusted 𝑅2 (0,754) which points that the model justifies a good part 
of PERMDIFF variation. 
 
B. Measure of financial aggressiveness 
To measure financial reporting aggressiveness I use discretionary accruals, where 
calculation of this measure is based on the modified-Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney 1995). I had estimated equation (3) below by Fama-French 12 industries and 
fiscal year, using Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights), where all variables (including the 
intercept α0) are scaled by beginning of year total assets. Residuals (η) from this equation 
(2) are the measure of discretionary accruals (DFIN). 
As well as in DTAX estimation some data has been lost in the estimation of DFIN because 
I require each firm to have at least 3 years observations, this way I end up with 1.722 firms 
(25.830 firm-years). 
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Table 2 
Estimation of DFIN (discretionary accruals) by Fama-French 12 industries and fiscal 
year from 2001-2015 
 
    
 
DFIN 
 n= 1722 Coefficient Std. Error P-value 
 Intercept -12,474 3,846 0,001 
 ∆REV-∆AR 0,056 0,002 0,000 
 PPE -0,027 0,001 0,000 
 R-squared 0,070 
   Adjusted R-squared 0,069       
Variable Definitions (all variables are at year t unless stated otherwise): 
TACC = total accruals = (EBEI + TTE) - (CFO + ITP) divided by total assets at year t-1; 
EBEI = earnings before extraordinary items from the statement of cash flow; 
TTE = total tax expense; 
CFO= cash flow from operations; 
ITP= income taxes paid from the statement of cash flow; 
ΔREV =change in sales; 
ΔAR =change in accounts receivable; 
ΔREV- ΔAR is divided by total assets at year t-1; 
PPE = gross property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets at year t-1. 
 
From estimation of equation 2, I obtain significant coefficients for all variables. 
Agreeing with Jones (1991) and Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009) intercept and PPE have 
negative signal and ∆REV-∆AR have a positive coefficient. 
Modified Jones model assumes that the positive variations of revenue would bring growth 
of operating capital, causing a positive change in accruals (consistent with positive 
coefficient in table 2) and the depreciations on fixed assets would decrease the accruals 
(consistent with negative coefficient in table 2) (Peasnell, K. et al., 2000). 
“This is based on the reasoning that it is easier to manage earnings by exercising discretion 
over the recognition of revenue on credit sales than it is to manage earnings by exercising 
discretion over the recognition of revenue on cash sales.” (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 
1995). 
Finally, this table also shows a very low adjusted 𝑅2 (0,07) which probably results from the 
small number of observations. 
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C. Relation between financial and tax aggressiveness 
 
Once estimated DFIN and DTAX (residuals from equation 1 and 2, respectively), I run a 
correlation test and obtained results presented in the table below. 
Table 3 
Relation between financial and tax aggressiveness using 
firm-years from 2001-2015 
    Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 Mean  Median Nr. Observations 
DFIN 0,0003 0,0027 14198 
DTAX 0,0011 0,0041 14198 
    Panel B: Pearson and Spearman correlations 
 
DTAX DFIN 
 DTAX 
 
0,3379*** 
 DFIN 0,1911*** 
   
Pearson correlations are tabulated in the upper diagonal. Spearman correlations are tabulated in the lower diagonal. 
*** Significantly different from zero at p-value 0.01. 
Variable Definitions: 
DTAX residuals from model (1) in Table1 estimated by industry and year of permanent differences on nondiscretionary 
items known to cause permanent differences and other statutory adjustments that are unrelated to tax planning activities; 
DFIN residuals from model (2) in Table 2 estimated by industry and year of discretionary accruals calculated by modified 
Jones model. 
 
Table 3 panel A shows descriptive statistics from DFIN and DTAX with a mean of 0,0003 
and 0,0011, respectively. These two means are very close to zero which is the result 
expected once these are residuals from equations. To run this correlation test, I eliminate 
firms that do not have observations for both DFIN and DTAX, so I end up with 14198 
observations. 
Table 3 panel B expresses a positive and significant correlation between DFIN and DTAX 
with both Spearman (0,1911) and Pearson (0,3379) correlation tests. 
Analysing absolute value of correlation it’s possible to conclude that with Pearson and 
Spearman tests resulted in weak correlations (far from one- perfectly correlated). 
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However, with this results I can conclude for the confirmation of H1, that firms with 
aggressive tax report tend to also be financial aggressive. 
 
Although, I already proved the existence of positive relation between tax and financial 
aggressiveness, I additionally run equation 3 and 4 (using OLS) to estimate relation 
between DTAX and DFIN when controlling for firm size, earnings management and tax 
planning incentives (presented in table 4). 
It is important to notice that these two equations are estimated with period of analysis 
between 2002 and 2015 because EM2 is defined with market value of common equity at 
year t-2, which made me lose EM2 values for 2001. 
Table 4 
Multivariate regression analyses of relation between financial and tax aggressiveness using 
firm-years from 2002-2015 
         Panel A: OLS regression of DFIN on DTAX and controls for tax planning and earnings 
management incentives (equation 4) 
 
        
  
DFIN 
  n= 1457  Coefficient 
 
Std. Error 
 
P-value 
  Intercept 
 
0,038 
 
0,002 
 
0,000 
  DTAX 
 
0,043 
 
0,005 
 
0,000 
  PTROA 
 
0,847 
 
0,005 
 
0,000 
  LEV 
 
-0,003 
 
0,001 
 
0,000 
  MTB 
 
0,000 
 
0,000 
 
0,922 
  EM1 
 
-0,002 
 
0,002 
 
0,264 
  EM2 
 
0,001 
 
0,001 
 
0,401 
  EM3 
 
-0,002 
 
0,001 
 
0,113 
  ∆PTCFO 
 
-0,886 
 
0,005 
 
0,000 
  SIZE  0,000 
 
0,000 
 
0,018 
  Table 4 (continued) 
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R-squared 
 
0,801 
      Adjusted R-squared 
 
0,801 
      
         Panel B: OLS regression of DTAX on DFIN and controls for tax planning and earnings 
management incentives (equation 3) 
 
        
  
DTAX 
  n= 1457  Coefficient 
 
Std. Error 
 
P-value 
  Intercept 
 
0,003 
 
0,004 
 
0,523 
  DFIN 
 
0,144 
 
0,017 
 
0,000 
  PTROA 
 
0,307 
 
0,017 
 
0,000 
  LEV 
 
0,011 
 
0,001 
 
0,000 
  MTB 
 
0,000 
 
0,000 
 
0,687 
  EM1 
 
0,007 
 
0,004 
 
0,067 
  EM2 
 
-0,012 
 
0,002 
 
0,000 
  EM3 
 
0,022 
 
0,003 
 
0,000 
  ∆PTCFO 
 
-0,096 
 
0,018 
 
0,000 
  SIZE  -0,001 
 
0,000 
 
0,002 
  R-squared 
 
0,264 
      Adjusted R-squared  0,264 
    
  
Variable Definitions (all variables are at year t unless stated otherwise): 
DTAX =residuals from model (1) in Table1 estimated by industry and year of permanent differences on nondiscretionary 
items known to cause permanent differences and other statutory adjustments that are unrelated to tax planning activities; 
DFIN =residuals from model (2) in Table 2 estimated by industry and year of discretionary accruals calculated by 
modified Jones model. 
LEV = total debt divided by total assets at year t;  
PTROA= pre-tax income divided by total assets at year t-1; 
SIZE= natural log of total assets; 
MTB= Market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity at year t-1; 
ΔPTCFO= change in pre-tax cash flow from operations divided by total assets at year t-1; 
EM1= 1 if net income in year t, divided by the market value of common equity at year t-1, is greater than zero and less 
than or equal to 0.01 for firm i; 0 otherwise; 
EM2= 1 if the change in net income from year t-1 to year t, divided by the market value of common equity at year t-2 is 
greater than zero and less than or equal to 0.01 for firm i; 0 otherwise; 
EM3= 1 if firm i’s actual earnings less the median analyst forecast for fiscal year t (as reported on I/B/E/S) is greater than 
zero and less than or equal to 0.01 ; 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4 panels A and B presents some similar results, such as DTAX and DFIN, both of 
these variables present positive and significant (at p-value 0.01) coefficients consistent with 
the conclusion of correlation test in table 3, that there is a positive relation between tax and 
financial aggressive reports and also according to Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009) 
assumptions and results. 
In both panels PTROA has a positive and significant (at p-value 0.01) coefficient and 
∆PTCFO has a negative and significant (at p-value 0.01) coefficient. These findings are 
consistent with profitability (PTROA) being proportional to firm’s tax liability and so once 
wealth maximization relies also on firm’s ability to reduce is tax liability (Ogundajo and 
Onakoya 2016). As expected and now proved firms who engage on both tax and financial 
aggressive reports to maximize profitability. Change in pre-tax cash flows from operations 
(∆PTCFO)  demonstrate a signal different to the predicted and is inconsistent with 
Roychowdhury (2006) who shows cash flow from operations (CFO) can capture the real 
activities manipulation around the zero earnings threshold and found evidence consistent 
with firms trying to avoid losses (e.g. by offering price discounts to temporarily increase 
sales). Coefficients estimated in table 4 for PTROA and ∆PTCFO are also in accordance 
with the ones estimated by Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009), with exception of ∆PTCFO 
when dependent variable is DTAX, which have positive and significant coefficient in their 
study. 
Table 4 panel A also shows that firms with aggressive financial report are usually bigger 
(SIZE) and are less levered (LEV), otherwise table 4 panel B express contradictory 
coefficients for these variables, suggesting that firms with aggressive tax report tend to be 
smaller (SIZE) and are more levered (LEV). All these results are significantly different 
from zero (at p-value 0.01). Relative to SIZE I did not predict any signal due to the 
multiplicity opinions in literature with some authors suggesting that once larger firms are 
more complex they have more opportunity to manage earnings (Hu, Cao and Zheng 2015), 
and others arguing that because of the high visibility and control, large companies will end 
up paying a higher tax burden (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Regard to LEV, the result 
obtained in table 4 panel A it’s consistent with the predicted, this means that earnings 
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management and leverage are negatively related (Burgstahler et al. 2006) although Frank, 
Lynch and Rego (2009) found positive coefficient for this variable on both equations. The 
positive coefficient obtained in table 4 panel B could suggest that leverage it’s a product of 
earnings shifting according with empirical cases studied above in chapter II section C and 
also with Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodème (2006) who suggests that debt-shifting is an 
important occurrence in Europe and found that national tax features and international 
differences in taxes are reflected in corporate debt policy. 
Table 4 panel B also denotes significant coefficients (at 10% for EM1 and at 1% for EM2 
and EM3) for all variables representing achieve of certain thresholds.  
The empirical evidence obtained corroborate the findings of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), 
who found that managers are involved in earnings management to avoid losses (EM1) and 
Degeorge et al. (1999) who provides evidence of account manipulation that might allow for 
avoiding negative earnings surprises (EM3). 
However, results are not consistent with achieved by the works of Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997), Degeorge et al. (1999), Brown and Caylor (2003) and Jacob and Jorgensen (2007), 
which confirm earnings management to avoid earnings decreases (EM2).  
Even so results obtained for EM1 and EM2 agree with Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009) 
evidence. 
Although not significant MTB presents a positive coefficient in both panels (A and B) of 
table 4, in agreement with predicted results and Dechow and Skinner (2000) and 
McNichols 2000, 2002 who suggests that market expectation of future growth could lead to 
manage earnings due to the pressure put on managers.  
Finally, analysing adjusted 𝑅2 from both equations (3 and 4) I found a much smaller result 
for equation 3 (0,264) than for equation 4 (0,801) which can in part be explained by 
integration of more control variables for earnings management (related with DFIN) than for 
tax planning (related with DTAX).  
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D. IFRS adoption: relation between financial and tax aggressiveness 
 
Table 5 
Correlation between financial and tax aggressiveness before and after IFRS 
adoption in Europe 
      
Panel A: Pearson and Spearman correlations before IFRS adoption in 
Europe (2001-2004) 
n= 1921 DTAX DFIN 
   DTAX 
 
0,4264*** 
   DFIN 0,2425***   
   
      Panel B: Pearson and Spearman correlations after IFRS adoption in Europe 
(2005-2015) 
n= 12277 DTAX DFIN 
   DTAX 
 
0,3194*** 
   DFIN 0,1828***         
 
 Pearson correlations are tabulated in the upper diagonal. Spearman correlations are tabulated in the lower diagonal. 
*** Significantly different from zero at p-value 0.01. 
Variable Definitions: 
DTAX residuals from model (1) in Table1 estimated by industry and year of permanent differences on nondiscretionary 
items known to cause permanent differences and other statutory adjustments that are unrelated to tax planning activities; 
DFIN residuals from model (2) in Table 2 estimated by industry and year of discretionary accruals calculated by modified 
Jones model. 
 
To test the link between tax and financial aggressiveness before IFRS and after IFRS 
implementation I ran the same tests as to prove the relation between tax and financial 
aggressiveness but I delimitate analysis in two periods, before IFRS adoption (2001-2004) 
and after that (2005-2015). 
 
As shown in table 5 correlation between DFIN and DTAX it’s stronger and significant (at 
1%) before IFRS adoption, either for Pearson or Spearman correlation tests. These results 
corroborate predictions made in this study and confirm H2. 
Therefore, these results indicate IFRS adoption in Europe is related with a deterioration in 
the link between financial and tax aggressiveness.  
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This result it’s not consistent with Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) evidence, who 
discover that due to scarce enforcement and investor protection, adopting IFRS seems to 
have increased the magnitude of earnings management and also Jeanjean and Stolowy 
(2008) who found IFRS adoption has not reduced earnings management practices. 
 
Same way I did in Section C of this chapter, I additionally ran equation 3 and 4 (using 
OLS) to estimate relation between DTAX and DFIN in the period before and after IFRS 
adoption when controlling for size, earnings management and tax planning incentives 
(presented in table 4). 
Also, period of analyses fits between 2002 and 2015 because EM2 is defined with market 
value of common equity at year t-2, which made me lose EM2 values for 2001. 
 
Table 6 
Multivariate regression analyses of relation between financial and tax aggressiveness before 
and after IFRS adoption in Europe 
         Panel A: OLS regression of DFIN on DTAX and controls for tax planning and earnings 
management incentives before and after IFRS adoption in Europe 
 
         
  
DFIN 
  
  
Before IFRS 
 
After IFRS 
    Coefficient    Coefficient   
  Intercept 
 
0,052 ***   0,036 *** 
  DTAX 
 
0,084 *** 
 
0,038 *** 
  PTROA 
 
0,818 *** 
 
0,855 *** 
  LEV 
 
-0,023 *** 
 
-0,002 *** 
  MTB 
 
0,000 
  
0,000 
   EM1 
 
0,001 
  
-0,003 
   EM2 
 
0,001 
  
0,000 
   EM3 
 
0,000 
  
-0,003 * 
  ∆PTCFO 
 
-0,887 *** 
 
-0,890 *** 
  SIZE  0,001 *  0,000 *** 
  R-squared 
 
0,876 
  
0,797 
   Adjusted R-squared 
 
0,875 
  
0,796 
   n 
 
456 
  
1453 
      Panel B: OLS regression of DTAX on DFIN and controls for tax planning and earnings 
management incentives before and after IFRS adoption in Europe 
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Table 6 (continued) 
  
DTAX 
  
  
Before IFRS 
 
After IFRS 
  n= 1457  Coefficient    Coefficient   
  Intercept 
 
0,002 
 
  0,003 
   DFIN 
 
0,487 *** 
 
0,123 *** 
  PTROA 
 
0,062 
  
0,319 *** 
  LEV 
 
0,048 *** 
 
0,011 *** 
  MTB 
 
0,000 
  
0,000 
   EM1 
 
0,013 
  
0,007 
   EM2 
 
-0,016 *** 
 
-0,011 *** 
  EM3 
 
0,001 
  
0,024 *** 
  ∆PTCFO 
 
0,234 *** 
 
-0,117 *** 
  SIZE  -0,003 ***  -0,001 *** 
  R-squared 
 
0,376 
  
0,253 
   Adjusted R-squared 
 
0,371 
  
0,252 
   n  456   1453    
***/ **/ * Significantly different from zero at p-value 0.01 / 0.05 / 0.1 respectively. 
Variable Definitions (all variables are at year t unless stated otherwise): 
DTAX =residuals from model (1) in Table1 estimated by industry and year of permanent differences on nondiscretionary 
items known to cause permanent differences and other statutory adjustments that are unrelated to tax planning activities; 
DFIN =residuals from model (2) in Table 2 estimated by industry and year of discretionary accruals calculated by 
modified Jones model. 
LEV = total debt divided by total assets at year t;  
PTROA= pre-tax income divided by total assets at year t-1; 
SIZE= natural log of total assets; 
MTB= Market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity at year t-1; 
ΔPTCFO= change in pre-tax cash flow from operations divided by total assets at year t-1; 
EM1= 1 if net income in year t, divided by the market value of common equity at year t-1, is greater than zero and less 
than or equal to 0.01 for firm i; 0 otherwise; 
EM2= 1 if the change in net income from year t-1 to year t, divided by the market value of common equity at year t-2 is 
greater than zero and less than or equal to 0.01 for firm i; 0 otherwise; 
EM3= 1 if firm i’s actual earnings less the median analyst forecast for fiscal year t (as reported on I/B/E/S) is greater than 
zero and less than or equal to 0.01 ; 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 6 panel A demonstrates exactly the same results as table 5 panel A  for before IFRS 
adoption, so the analyses is presented in section C of this chapter. Also, for after IFRS 
adoption the only change presented is on EM3 coefficient, which indicates a negative 
coefficient inconsistent with Degeorge et al.(1999, 2007), Brown and Caylor (2003, 2005) 
and Lee (2007), who showed that avoiding negative earnings surprises is not an important 
achievement for managers. 
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Table 6 panel B, evidence before IFRS adoption, shows the same results as table 5 panel 
B but PTROA, EM1 and EM3 coefficients are not significant and ∆PTCFO shows a 
positive and significant coefficient (at 1%) corroborating with Roychowdhury (2006) who 
shows cash flow from operations (CFO) can capture the real activities manipulation around 
the zero earnings threshold and found evidence consistent with firms trying to avoid losses 
(e.g. by offering price discounts to temporarily increase sales). Coefficient estimated from 
∆PTCFO in table 6 panel B also agrees with the estimated by Frank, Lynch and Rego 
(2009) PTCFO when dependent variable is DTAX and with prediction made in this study 
chapter III section B3. 
Table 6 panel B, evidence after IFRS adoption only changes from table 5 panel B in EM1 
coefficient that in the former table mentioned (table 6 panel B) do not have a significant 
coefficient. 
So with these results I conclude that, before IFRS adoption financial aggressive firms tend 
to be tax aggressive (DTAX), are less levered (LEV), have less positive changes in cash 
flow from operations (∆PTCFO), are bigger (SIZE) and are more profitability (PTROA). 
After IFRS adoption these firms have the same characteristics but are also less likely to 
avoid negative earnings surprises (EM3). 
On the other hand, tax aggressive firms before IFRS tend to be financial aggressive (DFIN), 
more highly levered (LEV), have more positive changes in cash flow from operations 
(∆PTCFO), are smaller (SIZE) and are less likely to avoid decreases in earnings (EM2). 
After IFRS adoption remain almost with the same results changing the fact that firms have 
less positive changes in cash flow from operations (∆PTCFO), and add that firms are more 
profitable (PTROA) and more likely to avoid negative earnings surprises (EM3). 
 
 
  
39 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study was to analyse whether tax and financial report aggressiveness have a 
positive relation. Thus I investigated and prove two hypothesis, the first denotes that “Firms 
with aggressive tax report tend to also be financial aggressive” and the second suggests that 
“The link between tax and financial aggressiveness is more significant before IFRS 
implementation”. 
To run this study I chose a sample of public firms constant in Worldscope Database, over 
the period of 2001 to 2015, to the EU-15 countries. After eliminated all the firms with lack 
of data in all variables, regulated industries such as utilities (SIC code 49) and financial 
services (SIC codes 60-69), the final sample consists of 2790 firms. However, additional 
observations had been lost in each model estimation because of the lack of data necessary 
to compute equations. 
To test the first hypothesis, I calculated measures of tax (DTAX) and financial (DFIN) 
aggressiveness. For the first one I used Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009) model of 
discretionary permanent book tax differences and for DFIN calculated the discretionary 
accruals with Modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995). After 
determining DFIN and DTAX, I ran a Pearson and Spearman correlation test to prove H1 
and it confirms with significance that tax aggressive firms tend also to be financial 
aggressive. Additionally, I used a model (equations 3 and 4) with control variables for 
analysis of firm size, incentives for earnings management and tax planning. With this test I 
conclude that financial aggressive firms tend to be tax aggressive (DTAX), are less levered 
(LEV), have less positive changes in cash flow from operations (∆PTCFO), are bigger 
(SIZE) and are more profitability (PTROA). And tax aggressive firms tend to be financial 
aggressive (DFIN), more highly levered (LEV), have less positive changes in cash flow 
from operations (∆PTCFO), are smaller (SIZE), are more profitability (PTROA), are less 
likely to avoid decreases in earnings (EM2) and more likely to avoid negative earnings 
surprises (EM3) and losses (EM1). 
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 To test if the link between tax and financial aggressiveness is more significant before IFRS 
implementation (H2) I analysed Pearson and Spearman correlation before (2001-2004) and 
after (2005-2015) IFRS adoption and found evidence that confirms H2. 
Additionally, I estimated the same model (eq.3 and 4) with control variables for analysis of 
incentives for earnings management and tax planning for both periods before and after 
IFRS adoption and found similar results to the ones revealed above. 
Before IFRS adoption financial aggressive firms tend to be tax aggressive (DTAX), are less 
levered (LEV), have less positive changes in cash flow from operations (∆PTCFO), are 
bigger (SIZE) and are more profitability (PTROA). After IFRS adoption these firms have 
the same characteristics but also are less likely to avoid negative earnings surprises (EM3). 
On the other hand, tax aggressive firms before IFRS tend to be financial aggressive (DFIN), 
more highly levered (LEV), have more positive changes in cash flow from operations 
(∆PTCFO), are smaller (SIZE) and are less likely to avoid decreases in earnings (EM2). 
After IFRS adoption the firms remain almost with  the same results changing the fact that 
they have less positive changes in cash flow from operations (∆PTCFO), and add that firms 
are more profitability (PTROA) and more likely to avoid negative earnings surprises (EM3). 
Both tests (correlation and estimation of equation 3 and 4) corroborate the two hypothesis 
proposed, giving evidence that in Europe public firms (with exclusions described above) 
who are tax aggressive tend also to be financial aggressive and this link between aggressive 
reports gets weaker after IFRS adoption in Europe. 
However this paper reveals some limitations such as reduced number of observations and 
the fact that I am assuming that same models are able to measure tax and financial 
aggressiveness when I chose to analyse countries that before IFRS adoption had different 
local GAAP and different tax obligations. 
Since this topic is current, as future research suggestions, would be of interest to study the 
subject with other models and compare the results and also make a comparison within 
Europe countries. Additionally, it would also be relevant to include other independent 
variables as control variables, including whether the company is audited or not by a Big 4. 
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